题目:
They usually get there a little _____ than we _____. [ ]
A. earlier; did
B. earlier; do
C. earlier; get
D. more early; do
答案:
答案:B
They usually get there a little _____ than we _____. [ ]
A. earlier; did
B. earlier; do
C. earlier; get
D. more early; do
答案:B
由一家或者几家大银行牵头联系组织一批参加银行,按照共同的贷款条件对一个受贷方提供贷款,借款人大多为各国政府机构或者跨国公司,这种贷款称为()。
A.辛追加贷款
B.联合贷款
C.项目贷款
D.政府贷款
男性,50岁。车祸致双下肢广泛软组织挫伤,入院查心率106次/分,血压15.0/8.5kPa,急行手术清创。
此时最先需要采取的治疗措施是:().
A.吗啡镇痛
B.扩容补碱
C.使用利尿剂
D.严格控制补液量
E.用大剂量抗生素控制感染
如图所示,AB是一质量为m的均匀细直杆,A端靠在光滑的竖直墙壁上,B端置于水平地面上,杆身与竖直方向夹角为θ,杆与地面的摩擦系数为μ,保持平衡,则此时杆与地面的摩擦力为( ) A.mgtgθ B.mgsinθ C.μmg D.μmg |
特发性血小板减少性紫癜的首选治疗是()
A.脾切除
B.糖皮质激素治疗
C.长春新碱
D.大剂量免疫球蛋白
E.输浓缩血小板混悬液
The news from America’s housing market is getting no better. As sales declines and defaults and foreclosures climb, pessimists fear that over a million Americans could be driven out of their homes as adjustable-rate mortgages are reset. What should policymakers do Congress is eager to do more: hence the calls to expand the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant government-sponsored enterprises (GSES) that tower over America’s mortgage market.
Fannie’s and Freddie’s political allies want two things. The first is the raising of the $417,000 limit on the size of loans that the pair may handle. The second demand is the lifting of caps on the amount of mortgages they may buy and hold for themselves. Fannie and Freddie could then ride to the rescue of struggling borrowers, injecting liquidity into parts of the market that have seized up. Their arguments are winning support, and opposition from the Bush administration and the GSES’ regulator is softening. Unfortunately, the ideas are likely to do more for Fannie and Freddie than for the mortgage market.
Start with the $417,000 limit. Lifting this could help if Fannie and Freddie scoured the upper bracket for borrowers who were struggling but viable. But their history suggests that they would cherry-pick those who could get refinanced elsewhere. And the huge-mortgage market may be correcting itself anyway: spreads over GSE-backed loans, though still unusually high, are falling.
It is also riskier. When they hold a mortgage, they take on not only credit risk but also interest-rate and prepayment risk. The loans they guarantee, in contrast, carry only credit risk. So as well as being just as effective, the guarantee business is also safer—and thus better for the taxpayer who unwittingly stands behind the GSES.
Moreover, even if they grow no more, the mortgage giants pose a clear systemic threat. Their portfolios of retained mortgages and mortgage-backed securities add up to no less than $1.4 trillion. It is bad enough that this is concentrated in two institutions. No matter how much risk they take or how they manage it, they can borrow at rock-bottom interest rates. If they got into trouble, banks as well as taxpayers would be on the hook. Banks may hold as much GSE debt as they want. Many have amounts that exceed their regulatory capital.
The giants were set up decades ago to help banks pool concentrated regional mortgage risk and to make housing more affordable. But as the market has grown deeper and more sophisticated, history has left them behind—hence their desire to get into any bit of the business that will turn a profit. The eventual aim should be to turn them into normal private-sector companies, by stripping them of the charters that give rise to the implicit government guarantees, and break them into smaller pieces.
According to the author, the proposal of the Congress most probably ()
A. break the giants into small pieces in case of safety
B. endow more power to the two giants for their development
C.rescue those who cannot pay back their loan in the housing market
D. promote the development of the part of market that has been seized up